Machiavelli's History of Florence:

The Political Theorist as Historian

by Mary Beth Immediata



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Written over a period of five years, the History of Florence, was Niccolo Machiavelli's last major work. Formally commissioned in 1520 by Pope Leo X (Giovanni de'Medici), the Florentine history, consisting of a preliminary eight books, was finally presented to another pope, Leo X's cousin, Giulio de'Medici, who had been elected Pope Clement VII in 1523. (Gilbert, trans., Machiavelli: The Chief Works and Others, 1027) In his dedication to the history Machiavelli gives full credit for the commissioning to Giulio de'Medici a cardinal, and virtual ruler of Florence at the time. Much attention has been lavished on his earlier works, The Prince and The Discourses, nevertheless Machiavelli's History of Florence, although neither as succinct nor as focussed, does provide insight into Machiavelli's political thought as well as to the uses of history in the hands of a consummate politician. The following paper focuses on Machiavelli's ostensible purpose in writing the history, the special problems that Medici patronage provided for a historian who was at heart a servant of the republic and the organizational structure with which he framed the events and wove his political themes.

In his preface to the commissioned work, Machiavelli writes that his initial purpose had been to write of the foreign and domestic achievements of Florence and to begin his narrative in 1434, the year of the Medici ascension to power. But upon examining two previous histories for method and content, he found virtually no descriptions of the internecine struggles of the republic and their results. Since it is at least part of Machiavelli's intent that this be a "useful" as well as a "moving" work, and since for him the central fact of the Florentine republic's history was her disunity and its consequences, Machiavelli reports that he decided to chance offending the descendents of great Florentines by writing in "full detail" of the varieties and impacts of political factions from the time of Florence's origins (1031). Although this poses special problems for a work commissioned by the Medici, Machiavelli indicates that this is necessary since it is his intent that this study of Florence's past inform the present.

If any reading (of history) is useful to citizens who govern republics, it is that which shows the causes of the hatreds and factional struggles within the city, in order that such citizens having grown wise through the sufferings of others, can keep themselves united. (1031)

He had earlier indicated this same awareness of the prescriptive potential of study of the ancient past. In his preface to Book I of The Discourses, he compares civic disputes of citizens to diseases which afflict the body. He expresses disappointment that contemporary princes (rulers) fail to examine antiquity in the same way that doctors examine the records of past practice when healing the sick. In that preface he maintains that men are in a "wrong way of thinking" about history, admiring rather than imitating antiquity. Lacking a "proper appreciation" for its potential as a summary of "practical lessons" upon which they can draw, men miss history's "significance."(Walker, ed., The Discourses, 98-99) If one is to draw the comparison to its logical conclusion, for Machiavelli, nothing less than the demise of the body politic is at stake. After a brief inspection of the History of Florence, one wonders if Machiavelli believes less in the ability of the prince or the ruler to heal than to postpone this inevitable deterioration. In his preface to Book II of The Discourses he acknowledges the bias that may be inherent in accounts of the ancient past, implying, among other reasons, that history is indeed written by winners (or at least by those writers patronized by the winners, hence their "obsequious" attitude) (ibid., 265). It is important to capture the "whole truth" as far as one is able according to Machiavelli, just as one is able to with

events in which you play a part and which you see with your own eyes, for of these you have an intimate knowledge, are in touch with every detail, and in them find, mingled with the good, also much which displeases you (ibid., 266).

More recent history also contains much which is displeasing to Machiavelli, yet this too serves its purpose as he explains in Book V of the Florentine history.

And if in describing the things that happened in this corrupt world, I do not tell of the bravery of soldiers or the efficiency of generals or the love of citizensfor their country, I do show with what deceptions, with what tricks and schemes, the princes, the soldiers, the heads of the republics, in order to keep that reputation, which they did not deserve, carried on their affairs. It is perhaps as useful to observe these things as to learn ancient history, because if the latter kindles free spirits to imitation, the former will kindle such spirits to avoid and get rid of present abuses (Gilbert, 1233)

It is as important to turn men's minds from vice as it is to "prepare (them) to imitate the other"(civic virtue). Machiavelli's belief, then, that the writer of history had an important role to play, elucidating that which had been "well done" in the past and critiquing the weaknesses of past human customs, coupled with the claim that his ideas had been shaped by his experience (Walker, 93; Gilbert, 1029) indicate that, as one might expect, this history will be infused with a political concern.

The eight books that comprise the History of Florence were presented to Pope Clement VII as a single volume. Future books were envisioned (Gilbert, 1029; 1408) which would have dealt with the "loftier and greater" events following Lorenzo de'Medici's death, presumably the "ruin" of Italy by Ludovico Sforza, the French invasion under Charles VIII, the expulsion of the Medici from Florence, and the establishment of the republic which Machiavelli served for fourteen years, first as emissary, then as the developer of a small Florentine militia and finally as the Chancellor of a new magistracy, the Nine of the Militia (Anglo, 15-22). One wonders if Clement VII, or any Medici for that matter, would have found these the events that called for a "greater and loftier spirit" as Machiavelli states. Machiavelli goes to some pains in his dedication to Clement VII to establish his independence from his patron, stating that this was a charge from Clement himself, that he should "write in such a way of the things done by your ancestors that I should be far from all flattery" (Gilbert, 1029). Machiavelli may be employing the dissembling language of the diplomat when he claims to fear the charge of disobedience to this stricture because he has praised the "probity of Giovanni, the wisdom of Cosimo, the kindness of Piero, and the high-mindedness and prudence of Lorenzo." All writers seem to be in agreement on these points, Machiavelli maintains and declares that he is writing "just what I found." He continues, however, that "Öif underneath their excellent works was concealed any ambition which, as some say, was opposed to the common good, I, who do not recognize it in them, am not obliged to write of it"(1030). What Machiavelli does do throughout the Florentine history, however, is to set up a political generalization and then to let actions speak for themselves, nowhere with more telling effect than in Book VII. In the first chapter of that book Machiavelli outlines the harmful nature of factions and distinguishes between men who "in behalf of the public" engage in political activity "founded on the common good," and those who seek a reputation "on private favor" for personal ends (1337). After delineating these "selfish proceedings" (currying favor with various citizens by defending them against the magistrates, lending money, dispensing patronage) and after acknowledging that sometimes such activity can benefit the state, especially when such factions are roughly balanced, thereby holding one another in check, he proceeds in the subsequent chapters of Book VII to describe the actions of Cosimo de Medici and the resulting supremacy of the Medici faction in just those terms.

Although Machiavelli confessed to his friend Donato Gianotti that he had been cautious when he wrote this work, evidence that Machiavelli was attempting to write "the whole truth" as he understood it can be observed in all parts of my history, and especially in the public speeches and private conversations, both quoted and reported, which in their ideas and arrangements preserve what is fitting to the temperament of the person who speaks without any reservation.(1030)

What is more, according to Alan Gilbert who translated the chief works of Machiavelli, Gianotti maintained that while Machiavelli had faithfully reported the actions of the principals, he also claimed

if anyone wants to understand Cosimo, let him observe well what I shall have his opponents say, because what I am not willing to say as coming from myself, I shall have his opponents say (1028).

Nowhere is this technique more evident or the parallel more obvious with the method of Book VII noted above than in the speech delivered in Book IV by a Guelf party leader, Niccolo da Uzzano, who spoke about the nature of Cosimo de'Medici's strength.

The doings that make us suspect him (Cosimo) are these: with his money he helps everybody, not merely individuals but the public, not merely the Florentines but their generals; he helps this and that citizen who has need of the magistrates; through his favor with the masses, he brings this and that friend of his to the higher ranks of office. So then it will be necessary to urge as the reasons for driving him out that he is compassionate, helpful, liberal, and loved by everyone in the city, which naturally is partisan and ñ since always divided into parties ñ corrupt, does not lend her ears to such accusations. (1220)

This technique seems to hold true not only for speeches but also for a variety of general comments about members and motivations of the Medici family as well and so bears further examination.

When reporting the negative public reaction occasioned by the proposed marriage alliance between Lorenzo, Cosimo's grandson, and the Orsini, Machiavelli writes that contemporary Florentines came to believe that the city was "no longer big enough to hold him as a citizen"(1351). Similarly, when describing the 1466 plot that arose as a result of Piero's decision to continue the alliance with Francesco Sforza's heir, Galeazzo, the new Duke of Milan, he writes "Everybody hoped to reduce the power of the Medici, but they were divided on method"(1353). But even more moving is the speech that he puts in the mouth of Niccolo Soderini, clearly a man of virtu, when he confronts Lucca Pitti, one of the opposition party members who is wavering and about to change course, supporting once again the house of Medici to whom he owed his position in the city:

I cannot, since I am alone, do my city any good, but I certainly can foretell misery for her. This decision of yours will make our city lose her liberty, and make you lose power and wealth and me and others lose the privilege of living in our native city. (1357)

One wonders if perhaps Machiavelli might have been thinking of another Soderini when he wrote those words. Still another Soderini, Niccolo's brother, Tomasso, (described by Machiavelli as "he who was prudent and very well understood his fortune and that of his house" (1367), in other words a man of virtu who nonetheless knew his limits) was responsible for persuading Florentines to support the two young Medici heirs, Lorenzo and Giuliano, upon the death of their father, Piero. His speech might be seen as simply advising the citizens to choose the lesser of two evils:

He ended by saying that if they wished Florence to live united and in peace, secure from divisions within and wars from without, they needed to respect these young men and to maintain the reputation of that house; men never complain about doing the things they are in the habit of doing; new things as quickly as they are taken up, so quickly they are dropped; to support a power that with length of time has suppressed envy is always easier than to raise up a new one that for many reasons can be superseded. (1367-1368)

At the time when Lorenzo de'Medici, on the advice of his counselors, was denying the Pazzi family civic honors and even dowries that may rightfully have been theirs, Machiavelli put prophetic words in his brother Giuliano's mouth.

Over the affair Giuliano de'Medici many times expressed grief to his brother Lorenzo, saying that he feared that through wanting too many things they would lose everything (1385).

The choice of Giuliano, who was Pope Clement's father, and who would lose his life in Florence's cathedral as a result of the Pazzi conspiracy, to deliver this wise observation was brilliant on Machiavelli's part. If the Medici did not wholly trust that Machiavelli would write a history fitting his patrons' prestige, their fears were not totally misplaced.

Machiavelli's method also reveals something about the major themes that he would pursue relentlessly down the years that he chronicled. Florentine history provided the final backdrop against which he would lay out some of the larger themes of his political thought. That this was his intent cannot really be doubted. He himself acknowledged that he had embarked upon a totally new plan when he found previous histories without precisely those elements which he, as political observer, felt most crucial. The first of Machiavelli's eight books traces Italian history with no special reference to Florence from 375 to 1434. Books II, III and IV were intended to correct the deficiencies of previous Florentine histories, narrating the convoluted twists and turns of domestic politics until 1434. Wars of the period are discussed only insofar as they elucidate the internal politics of the city. The second book traces the Florentine story from its origin to 1353; the third, from 1353 to 1414; the fourth examines the twenty year period immediately preceding Cosimo de Medici's return from exile.

Intertwined with this division in chronology and subject matter is an even more important thematic division. Except for the first chapter of his first book, which does not specifically deal with Florence, each of Machiavelli's first chapters presents a political truth. He acknowledges this explicitly in the opening chapters of both Book VII and Book VIII. [" But first, according to my habit, I wish to some extent to explain in general whyÖ" (Book VII, 1336) and "Öit would seem appropriate, and in accordance with our usual custom, were we to treat the nature and importance of conspiracies"(Book VIII, 1383).] In the first chapter of Book II Machiavelli returns to a theme that was among his very first in The Discourses, that the establishment of cities or colonies is a most "worthy" activity for an "excellent prince" or a "well-organized republic"(1080). The security of the region depends upon a growing population that is well distributed throughout the region. This calls for rulers with a "desire for true glory"(virtu). In Book III's first chapter Machiavelli similarly recalls a topic articulated in the opening chapters of Book I of The Discourses, that of the "serious and natural enmities between people and the nobles." Once again he points to Rome as the exemplar because the division was resolved in part by debating, or, as he explains in The Discourses, through the creation of institutions responsive to the people and enabling the expansion of the empire. In contrast, Florentine quarrels ended with "fightingÖexile and death of many citizens" (1140). As a result, whereas Rome's "natural" (inevitable) divisions led to an increase in military might, what is crucial for Machiavelli is that internal divisions in Florence wholly destroyed its military capacity. He returns to this theme throughout the chronological narrative but the insertion of the theme at precisely the period when the divisions between the Guelf and Ghibelline factions are narrated is significant. Machiavelli introduces Book IV, the book covering 1414-1434, the years of Giovanni de'Medici's and Cosimo de'Medici's dominance and Cosimo's arrest and exile, by developing the theme of Book III's first chapter even further. He states that a "city can be called free and her government can be considered firm and solid" when "being founded on good laws and good institutions, it does not need, as do other governments, the strength and wisdom of one man to maintain it"(1187).

Books V through VIII present the years of the Medici rule from 1434 to the death of Lorenzo the Magnificent (1492), freely narrating both foreign and domestic events. Book V's first chapter presents Machiavelli's perception of the cyclical nature of human affairs: "countries generally go from order to disorder and then from disorder move back to order"(1232). Machiavelli further delineates this process by postulating that men of ability are often succeeded by periods of quiet which in turn encourage periods of laziness which leads to disorder and then to ruin. Ruin necessitates a degree of order which calls forth men of ability who, when virtu and good fortune intersect, can truly lead a state to a period of greatness. Machiavelli maintains that Italy has gone through such disintegration, but then hastens to add that no ruler has yet arisen so that she could "proceed gloriously" (1233). From this point Machiavelli proceeds to castigate the anemic nature of mercenary warfare, "begun without fear, carried on without danger, and ended without damage." This reliance on mercenary troops who never achieve peace has resulted in Italy becoming a battleground for the princes of Europe and their respective captains. Machiavelli continues his diatribe against mercenaries who only impoverish peoples and princes in the opening chapter of Book VI. Using the relentlessly tight analytical formula more reminiscent of The Discourses, Machiavelli postulates that it is the object of war either to enrich one's self through victory or gain or to impoverish one's enemy. He reasons that when "victory impoverishes" or "gain weakens" then war has either not achieved its purpose or has missed the mark (1284). When war is a commercial enterprise fought by mercenary captains for private profit rather than public welfare, it is inevitable, Machiavelli argues, that victory would produce "nothing of benefit for the people"(1285). Mercenary warfare by its very nature deprives the state of the revenues of war (spoils and ransom) and forces even the victorious prince to tax his subjects in preparation for new assaults from an enemy who is never totally eliminated. It is this generalization that informs the history of much of the 23 years covered by Book VI and Machiavelli heaps invective on every historical example of mercenary cowardice and double-dealing that he can cull from the period. Similarly, the nature and consequences of factionalism discussed in the first chapter of Book VII underpin much of the narrative of that book. Machiavelli interrupts his chronological approach, backtracking to 1427 so that he can better demonstrate this facet of Florentine history. His ostensible purpose is to explain "why those who believe republics can be united are greatly deceived in their belief"(1336). He maintained that it was the duty of a founder of a republic to prevent factions. What becomes clear in subsequent chapters is that Florence was not blessed with such a founder. Factions in fifteenth century Florence are constant, vicious and prone to fracture. Only the liberality, understanding and far seeing prudence of Cosimo de'Medici and his ability to bequeath to his sons a "structure" that enabled them to surpass him kept Florentine jealousies somewhat in check from 1427-1478. Unfortunately for Florence, at least in Machiavelli's analysis, Cosimo de'Medici was motivated by private not public ambition and the Florentine populace had become corrupt, falling into "those evils usually generated in time of peace."

Book VIII completes The History of Florence. In it Machiavelli records Florence's history from the time of the Pazzi conspiracy to 1492 and demonstrates with an unerring sense of political purpose what happened to Florence when her factional opponents were forced underground after 1466. In the Book's first chapter, using the terse language of The Discourses, Machiavelli avers that when factional parties are forced underground, either there is no opposition or secret conspiracies, usually fatal to the conspirators, will fester. These will strengthen those against whom they are aimed, resulting in even greater power which in turn will result in even greater wickedness for all. This course is predicated on the supposition that fear will "pervert" even a good disposition because of the ruler's greater concern for his safety; that this will result in persecution; and that this, in turn, will generate even more conspiracies and ultimately the ruler's ruin.

The Pazzi conspiracy of 1478 is interesting in several respects. In the first place, it demonstrates nicely the boundaries that fortune imposed even upon a man like Cosimo de'Medici, who was unequalled "for his understanding of princes and commonwealths" and for shaping the course of events to his own will. Cosimo had been farsighted enough to ally the Medici, through marriage, with the wealthy and noble Pazzi family. Yet he could not reach out from the grave and direct the decisions of his painfully inexperienced and rash grandson, Lorenzo (1385). The complicated course of the conspiracy itself is described with the unerring instincts of a diplomat thoroughly comfortable with the layers of complexity and duplicity involved. The assassination of Giuliano already noted gives Machiavelli an opportunity to praise his patron unabashedly (1395) within a few pages of slamming the Medici whose "fortune" and excess "liberality" had deafened the Florentine public to Messer Jacopo Pazzi's piteous appeal for liberty. Upon the completion of the nine chapters (Chapters 1 and 2, Handout) detailing the causes and course of the Pazzi revolt, Machiavelli reports that Lorenzo deëMedici, in accordance with what was predicted in the first chapter, retained "at public expense" a bodyguard "to defend him from domestic plots" (1398). The next eleven chapters (Chapters 3 and 4, Handout) chronicle the history of the wars and battles of the next two years primarily between the Pope, the King of Naples and the Florentines. These chapters also include a host of minor figures whose ever changing alliances provide ample opportunity for Machiavelli to illustrate the vagaries of fortune, to highlight the depravity of mercenary armies, and to provide multiple examples of the maxim "that force and necessityÖ not writings and obligations, make princes keep their agreements."(1413)

Throughout the history, as in his other works, Machiavelli deftly weaves a story of the interactions of men of virtu with the impersonal forces of fortune. It seems clear that fortune imposes limits on man's ability to effect his own destiny. As in the fictionalized account of Castruccio Castracani, fortune provides the opportunity as well as the limit to what a man of virtu can accomplish. One suspects that Machiavelli feels that fortune was particularly gracious to Lorenzo de'Medici who was targeted by assassins three times. She saved him from a potentially disgraceful peace with the King of Naples by sending the Turks to capture Otranto just as the terms were made public. If Machiavelli truly hoped what he seemed to believe, then he must have hoped that Florence would eventually embrace a man of virtu and fortune who could push Florence toward that greatness he maintained would have been hers had she not been so divided. In the meantime he must have recognized himself in his description of the "good man" describing the facts as he understood them, in full detail, commenting on them "plainly"

to point out to others what is well done, even though the malignity of the times or of fortune has not permitted you to do it for yourself,to the end that, of the many who have capacity, some one, more belovedof heaven, may be able to do it.(Walker, 269)


First published June 10, 2002; last updated June 12, 2002

Copyright 2002, GJL