Report on Machiavelli and Guicciardini by Felix Gilbert

(focus on Fortuna, Ragione, and Virtu)

by Patricia LeSomptier Kavanagh

Sixteenth century Florence experienced a shift in political analysis. Preceding Machiavelli, Gilbert writes that 'the Florentines did not assume the existence of special rules for political behavior; every known rule of human behavior was also applicable to politics' (38). Political study shifted from an evaluation of what should exist in an arena defined specifically (and, therefore, inappropriately) by expected moral and social codes of behavior, to a new-fashioned and starker political critique grounded by what is. Markedly portrayed in his works are those social components that present the darker aspects of behaviors. To Machiavelli, these darker aspects (in specified arrangements, i.e. factional fighting within a class is not beneficial; percolating unrest between the classes can enliven a society) are, contradictorily, essential for a society to flourish and sustain soundness for as long as possible, before decaying and experiencing rebirth in a fundamental social gyre. Machiavelli's wisdom directed him to express his views using a traditional intellectual setting.

Conformity to traditional patterns also strengthened his message: Machiavelli was conscious that his unconventional suggestions would appear even more striking if they were presented in a conventional manner. This technique served well his aim to jolt his readers, but it was also in harmony with the paradoxical bent of his mind. (164)

There was another, more mundane reason for Machiavelli to concern himself with what and how he wrote. Fired and exiled by the returning Medicis in 1512 Florence, he was seeking release and potential re-employment through his writing.

After 1512 his constant aim was to regain a position which would enable him to have a part in determining the course of events. Almost everything that he wrote after 1512 was produced for the single purpose of gaining the support of those who could help him to resume his career in active politics. (161) He wrote what many people in power wished to hear.

Machiavelli's political assessment opposed the established formulas by insisting on the overt delineation and modeling of, not only what is considered noble and thus correct, but, as well, the baser motives in the successful political animal. He also called for the abandonment or reconfiguration of certain traditional ethical ideals in order to establish power, stability, and prosperity within a republic or principality. Momentously, 'his writings imply that politics are separate from all other spheres of human activity and that for those who take part in politics the demands of politics must be placed above all others' (Gilbert, 177). Indeed, Machiavelli proposes a new social dynamism that overturns the fixed moral properties of Christian sensibilities to construct actions based on a fusion of the rational with the instinctual, and human drives with political purpose. For Machiavelli, the genuine capacity to reason must include the ability to respond reflexively, intuitively, brutally. Machiavelli did not discover brutal courses of action. He identified, however, that to label certain brutish acts by their intrinsic moral nature (rather than by their potential merit as a valid and sound social response in a given political situation) as insane, demonic, or God-sent, trivialized and limited the function of the powerful and conjoined forces of thought, will, and intuition. It is this dynamism that, Machiavelli believed, could keep the mercenary Spanish troops from overwhelming the republic and control those hysterical and uncouth French from galloping from Italian city-state to city-state acting like the Visigoths at the gates of ancient Rome.

Law and diplomacy were important, but the saving trait, for Machiavelli, seems to be a vigorous, testosterone-ridden intellect, 'bestriding the narrow world like a colossus.' An action figure with nostrils flared, ready to abduct Fortuna, like one of the fleshy Sabines in the Rubens piece. Machiavelli understood that you don't subjugate and unify by inviting everyone to tea and making decisions, after listening politely and then asking for a show of hands. 'Force, which previously had been thought to be just one of the several factors which determined politics, now came to be regarded as the decisive factor' (Gilbert, 129). This belief did not excise ragione (reason) from the mix, but it reconfigures a world made stagnant by disunity, small skirmishes, terrifying invasions, political vacillation, general lack of confidence, and an indolent aristocracy.

Gilbert explains that the Florentines against which Machiavelli reacted in his works believed that 'their city was not strong enough to allow them to take the initiative and to shape events according to their desires' (33). Florence perceived itself surrounded by far-larger Italian city-states, with rapacious intentions, that, in turn, were pawns of either France or Spain. These fears made them great advocates of Machiavelli's detested 'middle way.'

Whether by cowardice or judicious instincts, the Florentines recognized their propensity for 'let's-wait-and-see' as ragione (reason) at its most exquisitely maturated. The Florentines felt that ragione was the greatest force to combat Fortuna's fickle whims.. Florence's Fortuna is both an agent of God or a development of a capricious Goddess, bringing either great fortune or destruction and unfathomable social despair. Gilbert writes,

The Florentines delighted in the use of ragione. They prided themselves on their cool and objective attitude in making decisions and on their capacity to discover in the apparent chaos of arbitrary moves a pattern, which made the actions of the other states, and rulers foreseeable and calculable. They considered ragione and force as equally efficient weapons. (40)

Through the 15th century, Florence felt ambivalence about both ragione and Fortuna. Fortuna was 'the emissary of God' or ungovernable forces, or, indeed, both. Ragione was highly regarded by some and recognized as the determining weapon against Fortuna, but events were also proving that 'reason was only one, and perhaps not even a very effective instrument in the political struggles' (139).

Machiavelli observed his world and its political construct, abounding with intrigue, manipulation, slaughter, deceit, and domination and surely grew vexed at all the wasted opportunities. How did fifteenth and sixteenth century regimes explain themselves? The city-states and monarchies of his time existed, seemingly, to conquer and despoil, yet the exquisitely refined words used to define Italian culture were enshrouded in Christian love, Christian redemption, Christian goodwill, Christian sacrifice. When not touching the hem of His garment, rulers were scheming, not to invade and plunder, but to combat evil and to do good by saving souls. Because, dear reader, in the end, what else is there but the Lord's work? This societal hypocrisy, this avoidance of self-recognition, kept cultures from using force (and its unruly subcategories) and, thus, from force's true and advantageous calling ñ to unify the city-state or republic.

Machiavelli appreciated that there was little relevant connection between political conduct and its divine (or pagan) associations and sought to simplify and to elucidate how political systems were run. When a ruler has another ruler assassinated, he should not be seen as either God's intermediary or demon spawn because such mythology (as political analysis ñ it might be just the thing to inspire the masses) is not useful in preserving or creating a healthy state. Machiavelli intended to do for politics what others had been doing for art, jurisprudence, and medicine: to clarify and codify the principles, which the ancients had followed. Machiavelli only wanted to state that he was applying to politics those methods which had been successful in other areas. (Gilbert, 158-159)

Machiavelli felt that our baser selves could be put to better uses, if we could only acknowledge our patterns of behavior and employ these set illustrations to direct societies toward his beloved stability. ' His basic approach is rationalistic. He regarded all men as equal factors; all are evil in the sense that all pursue only their own egoistic interests. On this assumption their actions become calculable' (Gilbert, 157). Man's great mistake was his wish to enforce Christian principles in a political world that worked by a far different set of laws. Machiavelli explained that some of the moral flaws and human disruptions in social systems can keep that system thriving. If one identifies the prismatic and imperfect nature of a thing, one can better fashion it to its most powerful effect.

Machiavelli, like many traditional Florentines of his time, recognized the vagaries of Fortuna, however he was antagonistic to the neurasthenic Florentine response to it. 'Action and initiative were preconditions for success in politics; neutrality and the middle way were fatal' (Gilbert 157). Will and force supercede moral right, ragione is flawed, and virtu is activated by man's elemental intuition. Startlingly, Machiavelli proposed that the instinctual (especially in one with virtu) is not negative and should not be excised or sublimated, but rather identified and directed. Machiavelli as relativist also maintains that there are no guaranteed formulas to control events because all healthy things are in continual flux. Successful management represents an acute ability to respond appropriately, using the attributes of virtu - intellect, education, courage, bravado, perceptivity, individuality, foresight, and cunning.

Fortuna, Machiavelli's tempestuous minx, could be subdued or mastered by the bold, 'In contrast to the static quality inherent in the belief in the existence of Fortuna's elect, Machiavelli's formulation presumed the dynamism of a constantly changing scene in which sudden action can bring about the assistance of Fortuna.' ( Gilbert, 194). Fortune does, indeed, favor the brave.

Machiavelli asks those who govern to use all the tools of statecraft, because it is the confluence of the moral and immoral, with an explicit civic aspiration, that will end factionalism, sunder petty aggression, and uproot political ineptitude. If there is a moral good here, it is the potentiality that a well-run state with synergetic institutions and a ceaseless consciousness that the purpose of a nation-state (in any configuration) is separate from other mortal and immortal interests, will direct, not only its leaders toward virtu, but the communal body of its people.

Some forms of government might be superior to others, but none could function without virtu. Details of Machivaelli's concept of virtu might seem quaint and contradictory, but his concept was eminently fruitful for it contains the suggestion that in every well-organized society a spiritual element pervades all its members and institutions tying them together in a dynamic unit which is more than a summation of its dynamic parts. (180)

Nicolo Machiavelli was quite the perky lad when compared to his contemporary, the deeply respected historian Francesco Guicciardini. This may be because Machiavelli died before seeing the dire outcome of 'the critical years from 1525 to 1530, ending with the fall of the Florentine republic and the firm establishment of the power of Charles V in Italy' (Gilbert, 253). Or, perhaps, it is because Guicciardini never thoroughly disengaged moral consciousness from political life. - consequently, he remained quite despondent. Dispositions aside, each admired the other: 'Guicciardini clearly appreciated Machiavelli's intellectual versatility, enthusiasm, and inventiveness, and Machiavelli admired Guicciardini's political clarity and executive ability' (Gilbert, 241)

Guicciardini's History of Italy continues to move and impress readers of history because he did not shape his work after the fashion of his times. Humanist historians would select a single narrative source (from various choices) upon which to base their works (a basic re-write) and they believed that their writing was created to offer moral guidance to the reader. Guicciardini wished to find in history the model for a sound government. The scope of his research, which was intensified by his private study and his research and documentation of his own family (in his ricordi) intensified and broadened his understanding of political movement.

His concern with the causal connections of political events resulted in significant deviations from the practice and method of humanist historians. Guicciardini designed his speeches to throw light on the attitude of prominent historical figures or provide factual information which had not previously been given in the narrative; and thus they are much more factual than those of a typical humanist historian. (Gilbert, 245)

Guicciardini was an aristocrat and, initially, believed in the ruling class's party line, which affirmed that no attribute had ascendancy over ragione (reason). Discernment and knowledge of the past (inherent in the aristocrat) was the impeccable formula to develop and maintain a constant system of administration. 'He was scarcely touched by the idea that energy or will power or virtu could be more powerful than reason' (280) Social desolation is accounted for as God's will.

Guicciardini felt that Machiavelli expressed himself 'too absolutely.' Machiavelli, though well-born, hated the aristocracy (they all needed to go till some fields) and he preached selecting whoever was most competent for a position. Machiavelli thought reason was useless (if not perilous) without the capacity for swift and assured action. What brought a sneer to Nicolo's lips was his conceivable perception of the ruling class as the effete using their discernment and knowledge to pause and reflect in various obscure dead languages, while hairy savages from France, Spain (or anywhere that wasn't Italy) burned books and dragged women off by the scalp. Ragione was essential if you were prepared to do with it. As for catastrophe as a divine response to dissipation ñ ridiculous! For Machiavelli, problems in a state result from an accumulation of bad luck, unskilled administration, or delay.

After 1527, Guicciardini's convictions altered drastically. If, in the humanist tradition, history existed to teach by example, things were looking bleak. He saw Italy in a passive role, a country of city-states teeming with hyper-salivating bootlicking fools with no one willing to regain control or break the 'chain of causal connections.' Guicciardini observed disasters generate catastrophes: external aggression, internal attrition, the desperation of the masses, and the disintegration of art, morals, and finally, customs.

Guicciardini was not, like Machiavelli, a writer who 'proceeded selectively.' The piling on of historical information and his own political career led him to unavoidable conclusions ñ he did not choose only the information that kept him positive and proved his points. Guicciardini finally 'averred that perfection is possible only at the beginning, and all things human are thereafter inevitably subject to corruption (284-285) Guicciardini devised no solutions for the restoration of peace and the expulsion of the French and he found that facts do not always proceed to an expected outcome. However, a good and strange light is cast in this landscape of nothingness, for Guicciardini 'returned to the humanist concept of the moral value of history: history appeals to a man to become conscious of his own intrinsic value' (300)

First published June 10, 2002; last updated June 12, 2002

Copyright 2002, GJL